UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NIVTH CIRCUIT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff and Respondent,

NO. 21419

~VS~

FEDERICO GUNZALEZ CRUZ,

Defendant and Appelant.

OPENING BRIEF
OF
FEDERICO GONZALEZ CRUZ

APPEAL FROM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SOUTHERN DIVISION
HONORABLE ALFONSO J. ZIRPOLI, JUDGE

FEDERICO GUNZALEZ CRUZ
P. U. BUX 107
Tehachapi, California 93561.
In Propia Persona for DefedantAppelant Federico Gonzalez Cruz

FILED

APR 25 1967

WM. B. LUCK, CLERK

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

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THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

FEDERICO GONZALEZ CRUZ

Defendant and Appellant.

NO. 21419

appeal from the United States District Court For The Northern District of California, Southern Division, Honorable Alfonso J. Zirpoli, Judge

OPENING BRIEF

OP


FEDERICO GUNZALEZ CRUZ

TO THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES

OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

COMES NOW the Defendant and Appelant,

FEDERICO GONZALEZ CRUZ, and files this Opening Brief.



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That this appeal has merits and under the provisions 3. of the rules and regulations governing the District Courts 40 and the Courts of Appends, this court has jurisdiction under 5. "(28 U.S.C.A., #2243) to review this case. That the facts 6. in this case shows that a constitutional issues under 7. Escobedo, exist in this appeal. Re: Escobedo v. Illinois, 8. 378 U. S. 478 (1964). The remaining allegations of this 9. 10. appeal has sufficient evidences to raise a federal constitutional issue under the provisions of the United 11. States Constitution specially the 5th and 6th Amendment 12. as make obligatory upon the states by the 14th Amendment 13. of the United States Constitution. That this defendant 14. was not given a fair trial as guarantee by the United 15. States Constitution and that this defendant was not repre-16. 17. sented by counsel during his trial constitutes another 18. violation of the right to counsel guarantee by the 19. United States Constitution. That the facts in this case shown that this court has jurisdiction because this case 20. 21. show that a constitutional issue under Gideon, exist in this appeal. Re: Gideon vs Wainright, 372 U. S. 335. 22. That this defendant was interrogated by the police without 23. the assistance of counsel and without being notified of his 240 right to counsel and inflamatory statements were used again 25.

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him during the trial.



PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The defendant in this case and appelant was charged by an Information filed by the District Attorney of the County of Los Angeles with the following offenses:

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In Count I, the crime of Conspiracy to commit grand theft, in violation of # 182, Subds. 1 & 4, Penal Code, State of California, in that the defendant and appellant Federico Gonzalez Cruz did, on or about the 22nd day of July, 1960, conspire, combine, confederate and agree with Roland Causey and with unknown persons to commit Grand Theft, to cheat and defraud by criminal means, and to obtain money and property by false pretenses and by false promises, with fraudulent intent not to perform such promises, but thereafter, and in pursuance of said conspiracy, combination, confederacy and agreement, and to carry out the objects and purposes of the same, the defendant committed certain overt acts. Thereafter, the overt acts are alleged in the Information (CT 1-4).

In Count II, the defendant Cruz was with Causey charged with Grand Theft, in violation of # 487, Subd. 1, Penal Code, in that on or about the 25th day of July, 1960, they obtained two diamond rings of the value of Ten Thousand Dollars and two watches of the value of Seventeen Hundred Dollars, all of the value of Eleven Thousand and Seven Hundred (\$11,700.00) Dollars, the personal property of one Charles DeMaio. (CT 5).



In Count III, they are charged with violation of # 487, Subd. 1, Penal Code, Grand Theft, in that they did take Five Thousand Dollars in money, the personal property of Hill's Acceptance Corporation and Melvin B. Rogow.

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In Count IV, defendants Causey and Cruz are charged with Grand Theft, in violation of # 487, Subd. 1, Penal Code, in that on or about September 29, 1960, they did take Five Thousand Dollars in money from the Realty Capital Company and Leon Lapin (CT 7).

In Count V, defendant Cruz is charged with having obtained, in violation of # 487, Subd. 1, Penal Code of California, Grand Theft, Seven Thousand Two Hundred Dollars in money, the personal property of Michael Schiller (CT 5-8).

To the indictment, each of the defendants entered pleas of "Not Guilty." (CT 10)

The trial was an extended one with a jury. Both defendants-appellants represented themselves at the trial without counsel. At the conclusion of the trial, the defendants were convicted; Causey was convicted of conspiracy to commit grand theft as charged in Count I; Cruz was convicted of conspiracy to commit grand theft as charge in Count I; Causey was found guilty of grand theft in violation of #487, as charged in Count II; Cruz was



Found guilty of grand theft in violation of # 18, Seed.

Penal Code, as charged in Count II of the information;

Causey was found not guilty of grand theft as charged in

Count III; Cruz was found guilty of grand theft as charged

in Count III; Causey was found not guilty of grand theft

as charged in Count IV; Cruz was found guilty of grand

theft as charged in Count IV; Cruz was found guilty of

grand theft as charged in Count V (CT 67,68).

Motions for new trial were made and denied (CT 73); Cruz' motion for new trial was denied (CT 82).

Cruz was sentenced as to Counts I and II to the penitentiary to run consecutively; on Counts III, IV and V to run concurrently with Count II (CT 83).

Thereafter, a Notice of Appeal was duly filed and the case. (CT 84).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

During my trial I have no Attorney in violation of my Constitutional Rights to counsel. Denial of the assistance to counsel is in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution as made obligatory upon the State by the Fourteen Amendment, Gideon vs Wainright, 372 U. S. 335.

At the time of my arrest when I was brought to the Los Angeles Police Headquarters I requested permission to call an Attorney before given any statements and the Police Officer Hull denied me the right to make a telephone call to an attorney. I

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
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- 1. try for about four times for permission to get to see an attorney
- 2. and the Police denied me this right guarantee by the Constitution.
- 3. Miss Helene P. Reichl was present when the right to counsel was
- 4. denied to me. During the trial she testified as follow in Volume
- 5. | 36, Reporter's Transcript, pages 4929, 4930, August 14, 1961.
- 6. Direct Examination of Helene P. Reichl.
- 7. Q Just before you left, was there a convensation before you left?
- d. A Yes
- 9. Q Who was there?
- 10. A Luietenant Hull, Dr. Gruz and I.
- 11. Q And what was said in this conversation?
- 12. A Well, Dr. Cruz wanted to call an attorney.
- 13. Q And was Dr. Cruz able to call an attorney that day?
- 14. MR. FAGAN: That calls for a conclusion.
- 15. MR. CRUZ: I will withdraw it and will reframe it.
- 16. Q BY MR. CEUZ: Did you see Dr. Cruz making a telephone conver-
- 17. sation that day?
- 18. A No
- 19. And did you know who did not let Dr. Cruz make a telephone
- 20. conversation that day?
- 21. A "he Police
- 22. Q And who was representing the police that day?
- 23. A. Luietenant Hull
- 24. Q Did Luietenant Hull recommend anything that day in your
- 25. presence?
- 26. A Yes



- 1. | Q What did he recommend?
- 2. A Well, Dr. Cruz wanted to get out on a writ that night, so
- 3. Luietenant Hull told me to go to the bonding agency, Schwind.
- 4. Q He told you to go there?
- 5. A Yes
- 6. Q Is there anything else you remember that happened that day?
- 7. A Yes
- 8. Q Were any threats made against you that day?
- 9. A Yes, Luietenant Hull threatened me that I might be deported.
- 10, He said it many, many times, and he also said that under no
- 11. circumstances I should get in touch with an attorney and that
- 12. never shall see Dr. Cruz again, and this one time I could be
- 13. excused, because I didn't know were I was standing or in what
- 14. I was in, but the next time that they see me with Dr. Cruz again,
- 15. then it would be unforgivable and then I would, for sure land in
- lo. jail too.
- 17. Q Now, was this at the police station that day?
- ld. A Yes
- 19. Q And after that day, did Luietenant Hull threaten you on any
- 10. other occasion?
- 21. A Well, it was the deportation question, I was scared.
- 22. As the court can see in the above testimony that I was
- 23. denied of the right to counsel and I was not allow to make a phone
- call for getting in touch with an attorney and even my friend that could get me an attorney was threaten and scared from do do by
- 26. the police officers. Effective representation by counsel at the



only stages when legal aid and advise would help him, Massiah vs. 1. United States, U. S. . . The guding hand of counsel 2. was essential to advise petitioner of his rights in the delicate 3. situation, Powell vs. Alabama, 337 U. S. 45. 69. 4. I was brought before Officer Lawrence W. Sloan, Examiner o 50 questioned documents, employed by the Los Angeles Police Depart-6. ment.. I requested permission to cal for counsel to assist me 7. before I make any statement and Mr. Sloan denied me assistance 8. of counsel, instead it went to threat me with additional charges 9. and putting my family and friend Miss Reichl in jail and he went even 10. to the extend of showing me, Miss Reichl in the next room, after all 11. this threat and after he told me that this statement will help 12. me to clear myself up I give a statement and I signed and I 13. keep signing a great number of other documents. That Mr. Sloan never 140 advise me of my constitutional rights to counsel and to remain 15. 16. silence, instead used all his power to threat me into signing a confession. The moment a person becomes a prime suspect in 17. an investigation, he has the right to consult with counsel and 18. no statement at all prior to counsel can be admitted as evidence, 19. Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The result to produce 20. upon his mind that fear that if he remained silent it would be con-21. sidered an admission of guilt, Bram vs. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 22. 562. It seems manifested to us from the indisputed evidence and 23. the circumstances surrounding defendant at the time of statement 240 and shortly prior thereto that the defendant understood he would 250 be permitted to go home if he gave the statement and would be 26.

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


granted an immunity from prosecution, Escobedo vs. Illinois. 28 1. Ill. 2nd. 41, compare Lynum vs. Illinois, 372 U. S. 528. It was 2. stage as critical as was the arrangement, Hamilton vs. Alabama, 3. 368 U. S. 52. In a recent case entitled the People vs. Matterson. 40 61 A. C. , 61 Cal. 2d ., 1964, the same officer Mr. 5. Sloan was reprimended for using this same tactics in said case and 6. the case was reversed by the California Supreme Court. 7. During my trial Mr. Sloan was called as the People's 8. witness and he testified as follow as recorded in Volume 27, 9. 10. Reporter's Transcript, pages 3652, 3653 and 3654, Direct 11. Examination By Deputy District Attorney Fagan: Line No. 16. Q BY MR. FAGAN: Thereafter, did you compare that siganture with 12. certain other documents? 13. 14. A Yes I did THE COURT: What did he answer when you asked if it was his 15. 16. signature? THE WITNESS: He said, "Yes, it is." 17. 18. THE COURT: When was that THE WITNESS: I don't recall the date, your Honor, I think I have 19. some other documents in this case, initiated and dated. I did not 20。 21. initial or date this one in particular. This, among other documents, were in my office, as well as Mr. Cruz, the defendant. It 22。 23. is now several months ago. It seems to me that it goes back to the very early part of this year. I don't quite remember, but 240 these documents, Exhibit No. 37, I did show to the defendant and 25.

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26.

asked, "Is this your signature ?"



- 1. Independent of one another and collectively, I asked that and he
- 2. said, "Yee" and that is how his initials happened to get on the
- 3. paper.

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- 4. I asked if he would initial them as documents that I had shown
- 5. him and documents that he has seen, and he readily acquisced.
- 6. NR. CRUZ: To which I object and ask the answer be striken unless
- 7. this police officer can prove here with other documents that this
- 8. is the signature of Dr. Cruz. This is hearsay all the way. He
- 10. THE COURT: Overruled, The answer may stand.
- 11. These initials that you refer to are what.

doesn't even know when it was done.

- 12. THE WITNESS: "G.C."
- 13. THE COURT: Now, will you point out the signature when you asked
- 14. if it was his signature?
- 15. THE WITNESS: This one on the short form, a portion of Exhibit
- 16. No. 37, and this in the lower right portion of the long form.
- 17. THE COURT: Now, will you point out the initials that he put on
- 18. after you asked him to put them on ?
- 19. THE WITNESS: "G. C." in the lower right hand corner of the short
 20. portion of Exhibit No. 37 and "G. C." in the lower right hand
- 21. corner of the long form of Exhibit No. 37.
- The state of the s
- 22. THE COURT: Do that so these juror or anybody can see what we are 23. doing. Hold it up so we know that you are referring to.
- 24. The above testimony was a direct violation of my constitutional
- 25. rights because, No statement at all prior to counsel can be
- 26. admitted as evidence, Escobedo supra., People Vs Dorado supra.



- 1. Confessions have often been extorted to save law enforcement officials
- 2. the trouble and effort of obtaining valid, independent evidence,
- 3. Haynes vs. Washington, 373, U. S. 503, 519.
- 4. While in custody at the Los Angeles County Jail, Hall of
- Justice, I was questioned by Luietenant Hull and Mr. Herman F.Roth, a deputy Real Estate Commissioner, assisting in the inves-
- 7. tigation of the case, about the case. I told them I wanted to see
- 8. my counsel and the police officer told me that it was not necessary
- 9. and that I should better talk nor or additional charges were
- 10. going to be filed against me. Luietenant Hull told me that he
- wanted this information to clear me up and to arrest Mr. Roland
 Causey. After all this threats and talk I give then a statement
- 13. or confession. That at no time did these officers advise me of
- 14. my constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent, and that15. this constitute a direct violation of my constitutional rights to
- 16. counsel. Every state of denial of a request to contact counsel

(is) an infringement of the Constitutional Rights, without regard

- 18. to the cirscumstances of the case, Crooker vs. California, 337,
- 19. U. S. 433, See i.g. Escobedo supra, Gideon Supra.

Attorney Fagan: Line 18-

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
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- During my trial Mr. Roth was called as the People's witness and he proceed to use the statement or confession that he took from me why at County Jail. He testified as follow as
- 23. recorded in Volume No. 27, pages 3693 through 3695, Reporter's
- 24. Transcript of July 31, 1961. Direct Examination by Deputy District
- 26. Q BY MR. FAGAN: Did you have a conversation with the defendant Cruz



- 1. A Yes
- 2. Q And when did that conversation take place?
- 3. A May I refresh my recollection on that?
- 4. Q Do you have some memorandum on that subject matter?
- 5. A Yes, I do
- 6. Q And has that already been shown to you and given a number?
- 7. A No. 93
- 8. Q And were these notes that you took following your conversation
- 9. or during your conversation with the defendant Cruz?
- 10. A Yes
- 11. THE COURT: You laid your foundation on that perfectly. You
- 12. found out that it was a statement from Mr. Cruz.
- 13. MR. FAGAN: I did all right, except I was using Causey instead
- 14. of Cruz, your Honor.
- 15. Q BY MR. FAGAN: Now, No. 93 is a typed up summary of the notes
- 16. that you had in connection with the conversation you had with
- 17. Mr. Cruz, is that right?
- 18. A Yes
- 19. O Done at a time when it was fresh in your mind?
- 20. A Yes
- 21. Q And do you believe that the matter recited there in are an
- 22. accurate description of the conversation had with Mr. Cruz.
- 23. A Yes
- 24. Q All right. Do you feel you need it to refresh your recolles-
- 25. tion from time to time for the sake of accuracy?
- 26. A Yes



- Q All right. Use it if you have to then, but only if you have to. l.
- When did you have a conversation with the defendant Cruz. 2.
- A On November 23rd. 3.
- of 1960? Q 40
- A Yes 5.
- Where did the conversation take place? 6.
- In the Hall of Justice A 7.
- And were Mr. Cruz's statements freely and voluntarily made? 8.
- Yes A 9.

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- Who was present during the conversation you had with Mr. Cruz? 10.
- Lt. Hull, Mr. Cruz, and myself. 11.
- Q Will you relate what was said by you and Lt. Hull and what was 12.
- said by Mr. Cruz? 13.
- The witness them went to give detail of all the information in 140
- 15. the statement or confession given by the defendant in violation
- 16. of my constitutional rights (RT 27)
- 17. The defendant was denied a fair trial guaranteed to him

judgement and orders appealled from herein. The trial was

- 18. by reason of the misconduct of the District Attorney, which I
- 19. urge was sufficiently aggravated to command a reversal of the
- extended; there was such repetition; considerable delay; and 21.
- a summary of the facts has been prepared on the attached Exhibit 22。
- B (which accompany the Petition #43329 to the United States 23。
- District Court, Nothern Distirct of California) and I respectfully ask the Court to adopt the points, the summary of evidence, and 25.
- the authorities, cited in Exhibit B, and I refer to them and 26.



make them a part of my contentions here by reference, and 1. respectfully ask the Court to adopt them insofar as they are 2. applicable to the appeal. 3. Described was given double punishment in violation of 40 Section 654, California Penal Code and the Constitution of the 5. United States. Said Judgement reads in pertinent part: 6. "Sentences as to Counts I and 2 are ordered to run 7. Consecutively. Sentences as to Counts 3, 4 and 5 are 8. ordered to run concurrently with Count 2." 9. (Superior Court File No. 237700 for the County of 10. 11. Los Angeles.) At the time of the imposition of said sentence 12. 13. on October 23, 1961, the Honorable Samuel L. Blake stated: "Counts 1 and 2, they will run consecutively. 140 15. Counts 3, 4 and 5 to run concurrent with Count 2." 16. "I divided them up. I believe they are one offense 17. in that connection, and I have run them that way, 18. giving him the benefit of running concurrently, the last four Counts, which, I think, is part of the same trans-19. action. I think he is entitled to that." 20. 21. (R.T. of sentencing - Superiro Court File No. 237700 for the County of Los Angeles) 22. As the result of the above sentence defendant has to serve 23。 20 years for the same crime because as the Judge stated above 240 they are one offense in that connection and the conspiracy 25. involves the same overt acts as the grand theft, being double jeopad 26.

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REASONS FOR REVERSAL

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I

THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL DURING THE TRIAL.

II

DEFENDANT WAS NOT ALLOWED TO CONTACT COUNSEL DURING HIS DETENTION, INFLAMATORY STATEMENTS WERE TAKEN FROM HIM WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, STATEMENTS WERE USED DURING THE TRIAL, AND DEFENDANT WAS NOT ADVISED OF HIS RIGHTS TO COUNSEL AND REMAIN SILENCE.

III

THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THAT FAIR TRIAL
GUARANTEED TO HIM BY REASON OF THE MISCONDUCT
OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, WHICH WE URGE WAS
SUFFICIENTLY AGGRAVATED TO COMMAND A REVERSAL
OF THE JUDGEMENT AND ORDERS APPEALED FROM HEREIN

IV

THE DEFENDANT WAS GIVEN DOUBLE PUNISHMENT FOR

THE SAME CRIME WHILE CO-DEFENDANT RECEIVED SINGLE

PUNISHMENT IN VIOATION OF HIS CONTITUTIONAL RIGHTS



ARGUMENT

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DEFENDANT WAS NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL

DURING THE TRIAL

Defendant was a layman of the law and did not understand well court proceedings and at the time he waived his right to counsel, he did not know what he was doing. When his attorney asked for permission to be realeased from the case he got more confussed, his attorney prior to his motion for withdrawal had spoken to him and threaten him about sure imprisoment if he does not releaded him from staying in the case. Defendant had given all his money to this attorney to represent him and was not financially capable of re-hiring another attorney and with the threats from his attorney confussing him, he went along with the withdrawal of his attorney from the case, however, the Judge was in error when he permitted the removal of my attorney from the case because after all he was retained already for this case and was the attorney of records. Defendant should have given another attorney to represent him or the Judge should not have allowed this attorney from withdrawn from the case. That this case was a very confussed one and another attorney coming into the case which had make it more delate and the Judge had refused a continuance of the case which was one of the reasons why my



	attorney wanted out because the District Attorney keep saying about
	how many months this case was going to last. I argued that this
	was the reason the Judge allowed my attorney to withdraw from the
	case. If defendant had been represented by counsel the outcome
	of the case will probably being different and do to the court error
	the defendant was improper represented and lost the case.
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"Denial of the assistance to counsel is in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution as made obligatory upon the State by the Fourteen Amendment, <u>Gideon vs Wainright</u>, 372 U.S. 335."

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an imparcial jury....., this amendment also guarantees that the defendant shall have a fair trial and be represented by counsel at all stages of proceedings." Amendment VI to the Constitution of the United States.

"It is obligatory made upon the States to support all the amendments and the Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV to the United States Constitution."

II

DEFENDANT WAS NOT ALLOWED TO CONTACT COUNSEL DURING HTM

DETENTION, INFLAMATORY STATEMENTS WERE TAKEN FROM HIM WITHOUT

THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, STATEMENTS WERE USED DURING THE

TRIAL, AND DEFENDANT WAS NOT ADVISED OF HIS RIGHT TO

COUNSEL AND REMAIN SILENCE.



Defendant was not given the rights guarantee to him by the United States Constitution as you can see by the testimony of Helene P. Reichl (RT 36). When defendant tried to contact counsel police officers denied this right and not even a phone call was allowed. Miss Reichl was amornished about getting in touch with an attorney and threaten if she did so. (RT 36) That the police tried everything in their power to prevent defendant from getting intouch with an attorney to protect his rights. That officer Sloan used threats and police trickery to get a confession from the defendant (RT 27). That during the trial Mr. Sloan produced in open court the papers that he made the defendant signed under threat and Mr. Sloan demostrated in open court were defendant had put his signature admitting guilt in Exhibit No. 37 and the Judge requested to show this exhibit to the juror (RT 27). That Mr. Roth produced in open court the statement or confession that they extorded from the defendant without the assistance of counsel and under threats and was marked Exhibit No. 93 and admitted in evidence and that Mr. Roth was allowed to use the statement to refresh his recollection in open court and in front of the jury. (RT That this statement was not taken voluntarily but under threats of the police officer Hull and Mr. Roth and that these two officers refused to let defendant to get intouch with his attorney that was in the building during this interrogations. That using Exhibit No. 37 in open court was a violation of my constitutional rights and the court was in error when allowed this to take place. That Officers Hull, Sloan and Roth failed to advise defendant of his

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constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silence at any time during his interrogations in violation of defendant's constitutional rights as guarantee to him by the Constitution of the United States.

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"Effective representation by counsel at the only stages when legal aid and advise would help him, Massiah vs United States, U.S. ."

"The guiding hand of counsel was essential to advise petitioner of his rights in the delicate situation,

Powell vs Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69."

"The moment a person becomes a prime suspect in an investigation, he has the right to consult with counsel and no statement at all prior to counsel cam be admitted as evidence, Escobedo vs Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964)."

"The result to produce upon his mind that fear that if he remained silent it would be considered an admission of guilt, Bram vs United States, 168 U. S. 532, 562."

"It seems manisfested to ut from the indisputed evidence and the circumstances surrounding defendant at the time of statement and shortly prior thereto that the defendant understood he would be permitted to go home if he gave the statement and would be granted an immunity from prosecution, Escobedo vs Illinois, 28 Ill. 2nd. 4l, compare Lynum vs Illinois, 372 U.S. 528."

"It was stage as critical as was the arrangement, Hamilton vs Alabama, 368 U. S. 52."

"Confessions have often been extorted to save law



enforcement officials the troubles and effort of obtaining
 valid, independent evidence, <u>Haynes vs Washington</u>, 373,
 U. S. 503, 519."

"Every state of denial of a request to contact counsel
(is) an infringement of the Constitutional Rights, without
regard to the circumstances of the case, Crooker vs California,
337, U. S. 433,"

"Confession taken from defendant during period of detention prior to endictment after attorney has been requested and denial access to him could not be used against him in a criminal trial, People vs Donovan, 13 No. Yo. 2nd. 148."

"It seems manisfected to us from the undisputed evidence and the circumstances surrounding defendant at the time of statement and shortly prior thereto that the defendant understood he would be permitted to go home if he gave the statement and would be granted an immunity from procecution, Escobedo vs Illinois, 28 Ill. 2nd. 41, compare Lynum vs Illinois, 372 U.S. 528p"

MIL

THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THAT FAIR TRIAL GUARANTEED TO HIM
BY REASON OF THE MISCONDUCT OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, WHICH
WE URGE WAS SUFFICIENTLY AGGRAVATED TO COMMAND A REVERSAL
OF THE JUDGEMENT AND ORDERS APPEALED FROM HEREIN.

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Annual Property and Publishers	That the District Attorney taking advantage that the
	defendant was acting in proper abused the discrestion of the
	court and subjected the defendant to many hours of trickery and
	did not acted as an opposing counsel at all. The District
	Attorney told the defendant to "shut up" three times in open
	court in the present of the jury and used all kind of language
	in refering to the defendant during the trial and his conduct
	was very unprofessional like and was cited in contempt of court
	by the presiding judge. That the District Attorney discriminated
	against the defendant during the trial producing great embarrazement
	before the jury at all time preventing the defendant from getting
	a fair trial. The trial was extended; there was much repetition;
	considerable delay; and all because of the misconduct of the
	District Attorney. A summary of the evidence has been prepared
	by the defendant in Exhibit B #43329 District Court which I
	respectfully ask to adopt. It is lengthy and, in the interest
	of brevity, I respectfully asks permission of the Court to adopt
	it as being a summary of the evidence on behalf of the Appellant
	Cruz.
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THE DEFENDANT WAS GIVEN DOUBLE PUNISHMENT FOR THE SAME CRIME WHILE CO-DEFENDANT RECEIVED SINGLE PUNISHMENT IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

In passing sentence the Judge gives the defendant his



time running consecutively for the crime of conspiracy and grand theft which were the same crime with the same overt acts and both related to each other and part of the same transaction. (C. T. 83 sentencing - Superior Court File No. 237700 for the County of Los Angeles) That the co-defendant Causey received a concurrently sentence for the same crime as defendant and that the court was in error and descriminated against defendant and violated the statues of unequal punishment of the Constitution of the United States for the same crime. (R. T. sentencing - Superior Court File No. 237700 for County of Los Angeles, Defendant Causey) (CT 82) "Where there are other and additional objectives of a of a conspiracy which are not charged as seperate substantive offenses, sentences imposed as to both the conspiracy and the substantive offenses do not violate the double punishment concept precluded by Section 654 of the Penal Code." "Though one substantive crime charged against the prisoner (Count V of Information) was not alleged or proved to be an objective of the conspiracy and was charged only as to the defendant and not as to the co-defendant, no objectives of the conspiracy were either alleged or proved which were not also

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34 CalRptr 43." (1964)

"Where, however, the conspiracy is not shown to have any objective apart from that involved in the substantive charges, double punishment is forbidden, People vs Scott, (1964) 224 CARd 146, 36 CalRptr 402."

charged as substantive offenses, People vs Causey, 220 CA2d 641,



"The Keller decision speaks in terms of the "one objective" test, but defendant contends that the logic of the holding is equally applicable if there are multiple objectives so long as there are no objective of the conspiracy separate and different from those charged as substantive offenses. People vs Keller, (1963) 212 CA2d 210, 27 CalRptr 805."

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New York apparently subscribes to a rule which holds, in part, that if there is an act which itself violates one statute and is also a material element of the violation of another, there can be only a single punishment, People vs Jackson, (1957) 2 NY2d 259, 264."

That the defendant appeal was final on September of

CONCLUSION

1963, but the case remained open until August 11, 1964, when defendant was committed to state prison (CT August 11, 1964) and that all the time defendant was in further appeal and relieves from the Court and this makes defendant appeal retroactive under the Escobedo Decision Supra and his case should be considered in this relation. I respectfully ask the Court to adopt the points, the summary of evidence, and the authorities, cited in the Exhibit B of #43329 USDC, and I refer to them and make then a part of my contentions here by reference, and respectfully ask the Court to adopt them insofar as they are applicable to the appeal of Cruz. For the reasons stated, the defendant-appellant



FEDERICO GONZALEZ CRUZ mespectifully make the Court that the order 10 and judgements appealled from be reversed, and to that end 2. appellant will ever pray. 3. 40 5. Respectfully submitted. 6. FEDERICO GONZALEZ CRUZ In Propia Persona 7. 8. 9. I certify that, in connection with the preparation of this brief, I have examined Rules 18, 19 and 39 of the United 10. States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and that, in my 11. opinion, the foregoing brief is in full compliance with those rules. 12. 13. 140 15. FEDERICO GONZALEZ CRUZ In Propia Persona 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22。 23。 240 25. 26.

